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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze government budget balance within a simple
model of endogenous growth. For the  AK model, simple analytical
conditions for a tax cut to be self-financing can be derived. The critical
variable is not the tax rate per se, but the ”transfer-adjusted” tax rate. We
discuss some conceptual issues in dynamic revenue analysis, and we
explain why previous studies have arrived at seemingly contradictory
results. Finally, we perform an empirical study of the transfer-adjusted tax
rates of the OECD countries to see which country has the highest potential
for fiscal improvements; it turns out that only a few countries have any
potential for such ”dynamic scoring”.
Keywords: Laffer effects, intertemporal models, dynamic scoring, growth
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One of the most controversial issues in tax policy analysis is whether a tax cut will
boost economic activity to such an extent that the government’s budget actually
improves. Traditionally, this has been discussed in the context of static models, and
the question has been whether the labor supply elasticity is large enough for self-
financing tax cuts to be possible.
1 In contrast, much less is known about possible
Laffer effects in a dynamic context. In view of the massive interest during the last
decade in growth theory, and in studies of the optimality of intertemporal tax policy,
this is surprising. To a political decision-maker, possible Laffer-curve effects may
seem much more tangible than the subtle welfare effects usually analyzed in the
literature on taxation and economic growth.
In the present paper, we will derive results that shed light on the nature of
dynamic Laffer effects. Since there are many varieties of endogenous growth models,
we will confine our analysis to the simplest one, namely the AK model.
2 For this work
horse model, quite a few analytical results can actually be obtained. It also provides
the kind of clean environment which is useful if one wants to explore some
fundamental conceptual issues. By means of illustrative calculations for the OECD,
we will also try to highlight the scope for dynamic Laffer effects in the real world.
To the best of our knowledge, there are only a few papers that deal with the
issue of whether a contemporaneous tax cut will finance itself in the long-run in
endogenous growth models. Based on numerical simulations of an AK model, Ireland
(1994) concludes that a ceteris paribus reduction in the marginal tax rate “...can be
the key to both vigorous rates of real growth and long-run government budget balance
in the U.S. economy today” (p. 570). However, using a similar model, Bruce and
                                                                
1 See e.g. Fullerton (1982) and Malcomson (1986).2
Turnovsky (1999) conclude that dynamic Laffer effects will not occur in practice –
according to them a ceteris paribus tax cut can only improve the long-run fiscal
balance if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is (much) above unity, a
possibility which they rule out on empirical grounds.
3
As we show below, an important reason for these conflicting results is that
there are alternative ways of defining a ceteris paribus tax cut in a dynamic model.
According to our own preferred definition, a government may indeed cut the income
tax, and improve the long-run fiscal position, even though the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution is less than unity. Yet, our stylized numerical examples suggest that
lower taxes on capital is no free lunch for the U.S. economy; an isolated tax cut boosts
growth, but this occurs at a cost in the form of a deteriorating long-run budgetary
position. When we re-calibrate our model to reflect a stylized European welfare state,
with a higher tax rate, and generous transfer schemes, matters look different. We can
not rule out the possibility that some countries are in the vicinity of – or beyond – the
peak of the dynamic Laffer curve.
2.   The model
2.1.   Households
Consider a one-sector economy, where production is linear in the private stock of
capital:
AK K f Y = = ) ( . (1)
In the following, we may think of K as including human capital as well as physical
capital. Since it is immaterial to our problem, we assume a constant population and no
                                                                                                                                                                                         
2 In order to emphasize the dynamic mechanims, we disregard labor supply altogether. For an early
application of the AK model to tax policy analysis, see King and Rebelo (1990).
3 Related papers, discussing tax revenue in an endogenous growth context, are Pecorino (1995) and
Bianconi (2000).3
physical depreciation of capital. Also, to save on notation we omit time indices. In a
competitive market, the interest rate is equal to the marginal product of capital:
A K f r = = ) ( ' .  (2)
Since A is an exogenous technological constant, the market interest rate is a constant
which is independent of tax policy.
At each instant our infinitely-lived representative consumer derives utility
from consuming an ordinary consumption good, C, and a public good G, provided by
the government. In the instantaneous felicity function C and G show up as additively
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t q . (3)
Like in virtually all models of endogenous growth we will assume that u(C) is of the
iso-elastic variety, implying that the intertemporal rate of substitution
) ( ) ( C u C C u ¢ ¢ ¢ - ” s  reduces to a positive constant.
The representative consumer earns the market rate of interest r on her net
wealth, W, which consists of the sum of physical capital, K, and debt issued by the
government, B. Asset income is taxed at the proportional tax rate t  (assumed to be
constant over time). We assume that the government provides the consumer with a
(possibly time-dependent) lump-sum transfer T. The flow budget constraint of the
consumer is therefore
C T W r W - + - = ) 1 ( t & , (4)
where  B K W + ” , and where initial wealth  0 W  is a given constant. Maximizing (3)
subject to (4) gives us the Euler equation:
                                                                
4 We have also worked out the analytics for a utility function which is multiplicatively separable in C
and G. It turns out that our main results go through also in this case; see Appendix for further details.4




where we have made use of (2). Since the real rate of interest is a constant,
consumption grows at a constant exponential rate. To ensure that the steady-state
growth rate g  is positive in the absence of taxes, we assume
q > A . (6a)





t t t e W
q l ,
where  t l  is the current-value costate variable of the optimization problem. Working
out the optimal path of  t W  by applying (5), it can easily be shown that the
transversality condition is satisfied if and only if  0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( < - - - sq t s A . If this
inequality holds in the absence of taxes (i.e. for  0 = t ), it also holds for all  ] 1 , 0 [ ˛ t .
Thus, we will assume from now on that the parameters always satisfy
0 ) 1 ( < - - sq s A . (6b)
This assumption thus guarantees that the transversality condition will always be
satisfied. Together with (6a) it will prove useful in signing some of the comparative
statics results derived below.
Integrating (4) and (5), it is a standard exercise to derive
t
t e C C
g
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t A t .  (7b)
The marginal propensity to consume out of total private wealth (inclusive of
transfers), mpc, is defined as5
sq s t g t + - - ” - - ” ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( A A mpc . (7c)
Here, it is useful to keep in mind that a tax cut affects  0 C  via two channels. First, a
lower t  increases the after-tax discount rate used by consumers to compute the
present value of transfers (the second term within brackets in (7b)). This creates a
negative wealth effect, which lowers  0 C . Second, a lower t  affects mpc. The sign of
this effect depends on the magnitude of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, s .
From (7c), it follows readily that








i.e., a lower t  reduces the marginal propensity to consume out of current total wealth
if and only if  1 > s .
2.2.   The intertemporal resource constraint
The government’s current revenue consists of the income from distortionary taxes,
AW t . The government’s current spending consists of lump-sum transfers, purchases
of private goods that are immediately transformed into public ones (think of the fire
department), and interest payments on the stock of government debt. We can thus
write the government’s flow budget constraint as
AW AB T G B t - + + = & , (8)
where initial debt  0 B  is a given constant. The government respects the customary
solvency constraint, which implies that  0
) 1 ( ﬁ
- - t A
te B
t  as  ¥ ﬁ t . The intertemporal
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t A t A t . (9)6
Equation (9), or slight variations of it, is the starting point for the dynamic revenue
investigations of e.g. Ireland (1994) and Bruce and Turnovsky (1999).
An equivalent, but in our view more illuminating, approach is as follows.
Combining the consumer’s flow budget constraint (4), and the government’s flow
budget constraint (8), we obtain the economy’s aggregate resource constraint
G C K AK + + = & . (10)
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At . The initial stock of capital,  0 K , must equal the sum of the
present values of private and public consumption.
5 Since initial consumption  0 C  and
the consumption growth rate g  depend on the government’s tax and transfer
programs, (11) is more informative than a mere accounting identity. In fact, (11) can
be used as a highly intuitive tool for students of dynamic fiscal policy. For any given
tax rate t , and any given transfer program 
¥
0 ) ( t T , one can compute the present value
of private consumption, using (7a)-(7c). Using (11) it is then straightforward to
compute the residual, G , that is left over for public consumption. It is by studying
how changes in the tax rate t  affects the magnitude of this residual that we can
characterize under what conditions a dynamic Laffer effect comes forth.7
2.3. Two definitions
In a static setting there appears to be no ambiguity concerning the definition of a
Laffer effect – if a ceteris paribus tax cut produces a contemporaneous revenue gain
there is a Laffer effect. However, in a dynamic setting, where a tax cut affects the
growth rate, the precise meaning of ceteris paribus is open to debate. Consider an
initial equilibrium of balanced growth, where the government lets both public
consumption and transfers grow at the same rate as output. There are now two main
ways of exploring the dynamic revenue effects from a lower tax rate. The first is to
study the revenue implications under the assumption that the government sticks to its
original consumption and transfer programs, in spite of the fact that a tax cut boosts
the growth rate of output. As a consequence, the share of aggregate resources which is
channeled through the government will start to decrease, once the tax cut is
implemented. The second is to assume that the government is committed to maintain
constant ratios of spending to output also after the tax cut. As a consequence, a tax cut
must now be accompanied by an expansionary spending policy, so that the growth
rate of government spending keeps up with the increase in the growth rate of output.
As we will show below, these polar ways of defining the ceteris paribus goes
a long ways towards explaining why previous studies of dynamic Laffer effects have
reached conflicting conclusions. Ireland (1994) analyzes under what conditions a tax
cut allows the government to raise a stream of tax revenues with the same present
value as before, and he assumes that the government continues to carry out its original
transfer program, even though output grows at a higher rate. Bruce and Turnovsky
(1999) analyze how the long-run fiscal balance is affected by a tax cut, accompanied
                                                                                                                                                                                         
5 Here, and in the following, note that the present values that appear in the aggregate resource
constraint are computed using the discount rate A, which is independent of the tax rate. The present
value of transfers that appear in the consumption function (7b) is computed using the after-tax discount
rate  ) 1 ( t - A .8
by those changes in the government’s spending policies which are required to
maintain a constant public sector share of the economy.
More formally, we may define the two competing definitions of a dynamic
Laffer effect as follows, the first one being
DEFINITION 1. Assume that (11) applies for some initial tax rate t , and for some
initial sequences of public consumption and transfers, 
¥
0 ) ( t G  and 
¥
0 ) ( t T .
A dynamic Laffer effect is said to occur if there is some lower tax rate
t¢, which allows the government to increase at least one of the elements
in either 
¥
0 ) ( t G  or 
¥
0 ) ( t T , while keeping the other elements the same.
The definition is obviously quite general, and not tied to the specifics of the AK
model. Conceptually, it is kindred in spirit to the ceteris paribus approach of the
literature on static revenue gains. It is also equivalent to the approach of Ireland
(1994), in that it does not assume that the government automatically implements
whatever fiscal policies that are needed to maintain the public sector’s relative share
of the economy. Our second definition presupposes that the government sets the
growth rate of public spending equal to the current growth rate of GDP:
DEFINITION 2. Assume that (11) applies for some initial tax rate t , and for some
initial sequences of public consumption and transfers, 
¥
0 ) ( t G  and 
¥
0 ) ( t T .
These sequences are such that G and T grow at the same rate as output, so
that  t t Y G  and  t t Y T  are constant over time. A dynamic Laffer effect is
said to occur if there is some lower tax rate t¢ which allows a higher9
constant ratio of either public consumption to output, or of transfers to
output.
3. Dynamic Laffer effects according to DEFINITION 1
Let us see what happens to government consumption if we change the tax rate.








According to DEFINITION 1 there is a dynamic Laffer effect if a lower income tax rate
allows the government to increase public consumption, today or sometimes in the
future. This is equivalent to asking under what circumstances a lower tax rate allows
the government to increase G , i.e. we ask under what circumstances the derivative


























































According to (12) a lower tax rate must be accompanied by a lower present value of
private consumption,  ) ( 0 g - A C , if  G  is to increase. But as a tax cut leads to an
unambiguous increase in g , which in itself tends to increase the present value of
private consumption, a dynamic Laffer effect will only come forth if there is a10
sufficiently large drop in current consumption,  0 C . In terms of (13), this implies that
the first term, involving the derivative  t ¶ ¶ 0 C , must take on a sufficiently large
positive value to dominate the second term, which is always negative. The decline in
0 C  is important because it allows for an increase in saving, which is crucial in
generating an increase in the capital stock (and hence the tax base) which leads to
higher tax revenue.
We can now derive a startling result. Assume that there are no transfers in the
economy, which implies that all tax revenue is used for government consumption. It is











Equation (12) then implies
) ) 1 ( (
) (
sgn sgn
, 0 q t s
q s
t - - -
- -
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But because of the transversality condition in (6b), both the numerator and the
denominator on the right hand side of (15) must be positive. We have thus proved:
PROPOSITION 1: If there are no transfers, there can never be a dynamic Laffer effect in
the sense of DEFINITION 1.
In an AK model without transfers, a higher tax rate will always increase the
scope for public consumption. Although it is true that a tax cut stimulates growth in
the tax base, this stimulus can never be large enough to compensate for the revenue
loss from a lower tax rate on the existing capital stock. A government that has as its
sole purpose to maximize the level of public consumption will find it profitable to
raise the tax rate, in spite of the adverse effect on economic growth and welfare. A11
revenue-maximizing government will in fact set the income tax rate equal to 100
percent. At this confiscatory rate, G  reaches its maximum, but the growth rate is
minimized; from (5) we have that private consumption decreases
6 at the rate  sq - .
We thus have:
COROLLARY 1: In an economy without transfers, the revenue-maximizing income tax
rate is 100 percent. At this rate, growth is negative, and equal to  sq - .
To understand the intuition, consider the last term on the right-hand side of
equation (14a). Clearly, the existence of a predetermined transfer program increases
the likelihood that a tax cut produces the kind of drop in initial consumption which is
required for a dynamic Laffer effect to come forth. Since the private sector’s discount
rate is the after-tax interest rate  ) 1 ( t - A , a lower value of t  means more heavy
discounting
7, that is, a fall in the present value of the transfer stream 
¥
0 ) ( t T . In an
economy without transfers, this negative wealth effect is absent. Provided that  1 > s , a
tax cut will still be accompanied by a reduction in  0 C  (this follows from (7d)), but this
reduction is too modest to deliver a reduction in the present value of consumption.
Let us then return to the general case, when there are both transfers and public
consumption. For this end, it is helpful to consider the case when transfers grow at
some predetermined exponential rate g , so that 
t e T T
g
0 = . This implies that the
present value of transfers in (14a) becomes  ( ) g t - - ) 1 ( / 0 A T . For the case of an
                                                                
6 At a first glance, such an imploding economy may seem counterintuitive. Regardless of its
desirability from a welfare point of view, however, such a negative growth path is logically consistent;
along this revenue-maximizing growth path, the Euler equation (5), the transversality condition (6b),
and the government’s solvency constraint, are all satisfied.
7 Note that the equivalent of PROPOSITION 1 might not hold for growth models where the pre-tax
interest rate is endogenous.12
initial balanced growth equilibrium – i.e., g  equals the consumption growth rate in
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PROPOSITION 2 brings out the key role of transfers in making a dynamic Laffer effect
possible.
9 In an economy where a relatively large share of private consumption is
financed via transfers, a tax cut will create a relatively large negative wealth effect,
which increases the likelihood that  0 C  drops by the required amount.
10
An interesting special case of (16) is when there is no government
consumption, i. e. we set  0 = G  for some given transfer stream 
¥
0 ) ( t T . This is exactly
the problem studied by means of numerical simulations by Ireland (1994), who offers
his analysis as theoretical evidence that tax cuts will, for reasonable parameter
configurations, improve both growth and the long-run budget balance of the
government. From (16) we can see that there is in fact a closed-form solution to
Ireland’s problem. Setting  0 = G  in (12), and substituting the resulting expression for
0 C  into (16), we have
                                                                
8 The case of g  being greater than the initial growth rate is not interesting since it implies that transfers
will sooner or later exceed GDP. For the case of g  being smaller than the initial growth rate, which


















which is considerably simpler than (16) since it contains only exogenous variables.
Equation (17) sheds light on why Ireland (1994) had no difficulty finding numerical
parameter values for which tax cuts boosted the long-run public budget. Since he
assumes that all distortionary tax revenue is used to finance predetermined transfers,
his setup is maximally favorable to the existence of a dynamic Laffer effect. Indeed, it
is not at all difficult to come up with plausible parameter configurations which will
guarantee that (17) holds true.
4. Dynamic Laffer effects according to DEFINITION 2
Let us now turn to the possibility of a dynamic Laffer effect in the sense of
DEFINITION 2. As a consequence, we no longer assume that G and T follow some
predetermined growth paths; we rather assume that the government always sets the
growth rate of both public consumption and transfers equal to the current growth rate
of GDP: 
t e G G
g
0 =  and 
t e T T
g
0 = . After substituting these equations into (12), and
differentiating implicitly, we can now explore whether a lower t  allows the
                                                                                                                                                                                         
9 Since we have argued above that a dynamic Laffer effect can be equivalently defined as a possible
increase in G , keeping transfers constant, and as a possible increase in transfers, keeping G  constant,
one may ask whether the condition that  0 0 < t d dT  is the same as the condition that  0 < t d G d . The
answer is yes. To see this, differentiate (12) with respect to t and  0 T , treating G  as fixed. After some
manipulation, one can derive an inequality condition for  t d dT0 , identical to (16).
10 Needless to say, a fall in the present value of transfers does not imply that individuals get worse off
in terms of welfare.14
government to maintain a higher ratio of either  0 0 /Y G  or  0 0 /Y T . Since Y0 (= 0 AK ) is
exogenously given, all information about these ratios is in the derivatives  t d dG / 0






  if and only if   0 )] 1 ( [ 0 0 < - + s B K A . (18)
The inequality condition (18) gives us necessary and sufficient conditions for a
dynamic Laffer effect to obtain, in the sense of DEFINITION 2.
Can this condition ever be satisfied? Bruce and Turnovsky (1999) argue as if it
could.
12 They state (in their Proposition 1, on p. 172) that a necessary condition for
Laffer curve effects to obtain is that  1 > s , a condition that conforms well to our
condition (18). They then reject this condition on the empirical ground that
econometric studies (discussed below) indicate that s  is in fact below unity. We will
now show analytically that as long as the consumer’s solvency constraint (6b) is
satisfied, there can not be any Laffer effects regardless of the value of s . We will
thus dismiss Laffer effects according to DEFINITION 2 in the AK model on theoretical
grounds.
Assume that a dynamic Laffer effect is possible. By (18) it must then hold that
0 ) 1 ( 0 0 < - + s B K   (19)
Since G, T, C and W always grow at the same rate g, (9) and (11) can be written as
) /( ) ( ) /( 0 0 0 0 g g t - + + = - A T G B A AW  and  ) /( ) /( 0 0 0 g g - + - = A G A C K ,
respectively. Combining these expressions with (19), we obtain
) 1 )( ( 0 0 0 0 0 - - - < + s t T G AW C G . (20)
                                                                
11 By the same reasoning as in footnote 9 one can show that  t d dG / 0  has the same sign as  t d dT / 0 .
Thus, it is again sufficient to concentrate on just one of the two derivates.15
The expression for C0 is obtained from (7b) and (7c). Substituting this into (20), and
rearranging terms, yields  ) ( ) ( 0 0 0 0 T G AW W A - - < - t s g . Recalling the definition of
g  from (5) we finally have that the inequality
) ( )) ( ( 0 0 0 T G W A A + - < - - s q s (21)
must be satisfied if a dynamic Laffer effect is to come forth. But the left-hand side of
(21) is positive by the transversality condition (6b). Thus, (21) can not be satisfied,
13
which implies that our initial assumption (19) must be false. We have thus proved
PROPOSITION 3: There can never be a dynamic Laffer effect in the sense of
DEFINITION 2.
The intuition behind this result is most easily seen from our aggregate resource
constraint (11). Our analysis of Laffer effects in the sense of DEFINITION 1 rested on
the observation that the drop in initial consumption  0 C  must be of such a magnitude
that it compensates for the fact that the growth stimulus from a lower tax rate tends to
increase the present value of private consumption. When we study Laffer effects in
the sense of DEFINITION 2, we impose an extra burden of adjustment on  0 C ; the drop
in  0 C  must now also compensate for the increase in the present value of public
                                                                                                                                                                                         
12 Bruce and Turnovsky (1999) use a more complicated model, which also includes a consumption tax,
productive public investments, and a utility function which is multiplicative in C and G (like the one
analyzed in our Appendix). Basically, however, their model is an AK model, just like ours.
13 There are two (implausible) cases for which (21) might be satisfied, the first being that
0 0 0 £ + T G . G0 is non-negative by definition. It is perhaps possible to conceive of  0 0 < T , but such
negative transfers would be economically equivalent to introducing lump-sum taxes in a model which
is specifically designed to analyze the effects of distortive taxation. The second case for which (21)
might hold is if W0 is negative. Since W0 = K0 + B0, and since K0 is always positive, a negative value
for W0 would require a value for B0 which is negative and large in absolute value. This, too, might be
ruled out as implausible, as it would require the government to own claims on the private sector that are
more valuable than the entire capital stock. (We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out
this possibility.)16
consumption,  ) /( 0 g - ” A G G , which accompanies the tax cut. And at the same time
DEFINITION 2 introduces a transfer policy that reduces the magnitude of the
consumption drop. Since transfers start to grow at higher rate when the tax cut takes
place, the negative wealth effect, which in the previous section turned out to be
decisive in generating the required drop in  0 C , will be less strong.
5. Some empirical illustrations for the OECD
In which countries is a tax cut on capital most likely to be accompanied by higher
growth as well as an improved long-run fiscal balance of the government? Our
PROPOSITION 3 rules out Laffer effects according to DEFINITION 2, but the less
demanding DEFINITION 1 is at least theoretically possible. Rearranging the inequality
condition (16), a necessary and sufficient condition for a Laffer effect in the sense of



















The right-hand side of (16’) – which is always greater than zero because of condition
(6b) – contains preference and technology parameters that are difficult to measure, but
that can be assumed, as a first approximation, to be equal across countries. We may
think of the left-hand side as a transfer-adjusted aggregate tax rate. It contains policy
parameters for which we can easily obtain numerical values, which will typically vary
widely across countries. A ranking according to this statistic gives an indication of
which countries have the highest potential for self-financing tax cuts – provided that
all countries satisfy the standard solvency assumption, and that they all follow a
steady-state growth path. Unlike an ordinary tax rate, our transfer-adjusted tax rate17
can be in excess of 100 percent; in the limit, when  1 0 0 ﬁ T C  (think of a socialist
economy!), the left-hand side approaches infinity. Conversely, when  ¥ ﬁ 0 0 T C , the
transfer-adjusted tax rate approaches zero (this is an implication of PROPOSITION 1).
Before looking at the transfer-adjusted tax rates reported in Table 1 below, a
few words of caution are warranted. First, the question is whether the AK model can
be taken seriously, in the sense that analytical results derived from that model can be
regarded as relevant when considering the economies of the real world. This is clearly
an open question.
14 For instance, the fact that the model abstracts from labor (capital
is the only input) seems questionable. On the other hand, it is important to keep in
mind that the variable K should be thought of as representing a broad aggregate,
including human capital. Since raw labor probably constitutes a small proportion of
total factor inputs in developed countries, it is not obvious that the omission of this
particular factor is a very serious drawback.
Second, given that one has accepted the model per se, the problem remains of
finding reasonable parameter values for it. In the theoretical model, the tax rate t  is
well-defined: it is the tax rate on reproducible capital, which is the only factor of
production. In the actual world, physical capital is taxed by the corporate income tax
as well as by the personal income tax, while human capital is subject to payroll taxes,
as well as to personal income taxes. Things are further complicated by the fact that, in
a closed economy, the effective tax burden on human capital is mainly determined by
the progressivity of the labor income tax schedule, rather than by the average tax rate.
For simplicity, we have disregarded all these complications, and we set t  equal to the
                                                                
14 For a vigorous defense of the empirical usefulness of the AK model, see McGratten (1998).18
tax-to-GDP ratios reported in the OECD Revenue Statistics 1965/98 (Paris 1999).
15 In
that publication, there are two measures of the aggregate tax ratio, namely “Table 1:
Total tax revenue as percentage of GDP”, and ”Table 2: Total tax revenue (excluding
social security) as percentage of GDP”. Whether social security contributions should
be counted as taxes or not depends on whether they are actuarially fair. As this varies
over social security systems and over countries, we have made computations using
both alternatives when we have analyzed (16’). Initial transfers  0 T  and consumption
0 C  are taken from the OECD National Accounts 1984-1996, Volume II (Paris 1998).
Most figures refer to 1996, but for some countries no later data than 1994 or 1995
were available.
(Insert Table 1 here)
The results are shown in Table 1. We see that the ranking of the countries
remains virtually the same, regardless of whether we define t  as including or
excluding social security contributions. The transfer-adjusted tax rate of the countries
at the top is 3 or 4 times as large as that of the countries in the middle, and 5-10 times
as large as that of the countries at the bottom of the table. The countries with most
potential for self-financing tax cuts are the welfare states in Northern and Western
Europe. At the other end of the scale, with transfer-adjusted tax rates well below ten
percent, we find the United States, Iceland, and Korea, where public transfers are
modest fractions of private consumption.
                                                                
15 We are not the only ones brave enough to reduce the hundreds of special provisions of the actual tax
code to one or two flat rate taxes on reproducible factors in a simple growth model; see e.g. Lucas
(1990) and Stokey and Rebelo (1995).19
A much more difficult question is whether countries actually are on the
downward-sloping segment of the Laffer curve. To answer this question, we need
reliable estimates of the parameters A, s and q  on the right-hand side of (16’). As for
A, Feldstein (1996) reports that the real rate of return to equity in the US has been 9.3
percent per annum. This figure has been criticized for being too high, but since our
model can be thought of as including human as well as physical capital, it does not
seem entirely unrealistic as a measure of A. On the other hand, Ireland (1994) and
King and Rebelo (1990) use an estimate of A equal to 16.5 percent. In the following
we simply assume that  1 . 0 = A . There is little empirical ground for choosing a
particular value of q. Here, we simply set  02 . 0 = q .
As for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, Ireland (1994), in line with
King and Rebelo (1990), set s equal to unity. As already noted, such a value seems
large when compared to available empirical estimates. A number of
macroeconometric studies, see e.g. Campbell and Mankiw (1991), have reported
estimates of s which are close to zero. But when comparing the micro and
macroeconometric evidence, Attanasio and Weber (1993) conclude that the aggregate
evidence is biased downward. Their own preferred estimates of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution range from 0.3 (on aggregate British data) to 0.8 (on cohort
data). We adopt these figures as our benchmark values
16 for s .
When  3 . 0 = s  the right-hand side of (16’) becomes 2.53. If this number is
correct, no country in Table 1 is even close of being in the position of enjoying a self-
financing tax cut. Sweden comes closest, but its transfer-adjusted tax rate of 0.618 is
                                                                
16  It might be noted that the parameters that we have chosen produce a range of growth rates that
appears to be fairly reasonable. With  1 . 0 = A ,  02 . 0 = q ,  3 . 0 = s  and  4 . 0 = t  – an aggregate tax rate
which appears to fit many European countries – the (instantaneous) growth rate is 1.2 percent; when we
rather set  8 . 0 = s  the growth rate is 3.2 percent.20
still much too low. If the left-hand side of (16’) is to be as large as 2.53, given the
Swedish aggregate tax rate of 0.519, the ratio of current transfers to private
consumption,  0 0 C T , needs to be as large as 0.826. This is much above the actual
Swedish transfer rate, which was 0.543 in 1996.
When  8 . 0 = s  the right-hand side of (16’) drops drastically, down to 0.45.
Now, dynamic Laffer effects seem possible for some countries. When t  includes
social security contributions, Sweden, Finland and Denmark would find a tax cut
profitable. When t  excludes social security, only Denmark can enjoy a self-financing
tax cut, though Sweden (with a transfer-adjusted tax rate of 0.434) is a borderline
case. If we increase s  further, to 0.9 (which is still well within the bounds of
confidence found in the cohort estimates of Attanasio and Weber (1993)), the right-
hand side of (16’) drops to 0.31, which implies that also countries like the
Netherlands, France, Belgium and Austria may enjoy the benefits of a dynamic Laffer
effect. It is also of some interest to note that if a low-transfer country like the USA is
to enjoy a dynamic Laffer effect, s  needs to be as large as 1.15.
A conclusion to be drawn from this exercise is that the results are very
sensitive to the assumptions made. In particular, we need a very precise estimate of
the intertemporal rate of substitution to say something trustworthy about the scope for
a dynamic Laffer effect. For those who put faith in the macroeconometric evidence
suggesting that s  is close to zero, the conclusion seems to be that lower taxes on
capital is no free lunch – other taxes need to be raised, either today or tomorrow, to
compensate for the dynamic revenue loss. For those who rather prefer the cohort
estimates of Attanasio and Weber (1993), suggesting that the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution is higher (but still below unity), the lesson seems to be that a handful
of countries might be in the vicinity of the peak of the dynamic Laffer curve.21
6. Conclusions
This paper makes the following points. The concept of a Laffer curve effect is not
self-evident in an intertemporal framework. We explore two possible definitions of
such effects. The first one assumes that government spending follows some
predetermined path, and the question is whether a tax cut will permit a higher level of
spending in one period without requiring a lower level of spending in another. The
other definition deals with a predetermined ratio of government spending to GDP, and
the question is whether a tax cut will permit a higher spending-to-GDP ratio. We
show that there can never be any dynamic Laffer effects according to the second
definition, while the magnitude of government’s transfers to households play a crucial
role for the scope for dynamic Laffer effects according to the first definition. Here, it
turns out that the critical variable is not the tax rate per se, but the “transfer-adjusted”
tax rate.
Our illustrative simulations suggest that a dynamic Laffer effect is possible
only for the high-tax, high-transfer economies of Northern and Western Europe. But
this does not imply that consumers in the other countries listed in Table 1, including
the United States, would not be better off if tax rates were lowered. A full analysis of
optimal fiscal policy, and of how optimal fiscal policy compares to actual fiscal
policies around the world, is clearly a worthy subject for future research.
Finally, all our analytical results refer to the AK model. An interesting agenda
for future research is to systematically study the scope for dynamic Laffer effects in
other types of endogenous growth models.22
Appendix
This Appendix shows that our main results extend to the case when the utility
function in (3) is multiplicative, rather than additive, in C and G. Consider the
following utility function, used by e.g. Bruce and Turnovsky (1999):
dt e G C
s
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t s q h -
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where  1 < < ¥ - s , and  0 ‡ h . Moreover, to ensure concavity, we have that  1 < s h ,
and  . 1 ) 1 ( < +h s  It also follows that s is related to our measure of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution via  ) 1 /( 1 s - = s . Maximizing (A1) subject to (4) gives us
the modified Euler equation









Using (A2) it is easy to see how multiplicative preferences affect our analysis of
dynamic Laffer effects.
Let us start with the case of DEFINITION 1. Under the assumption that G grows
at a predetermined exponential rate  G g , we can write (A2) as




where  G sg h q q - = ¢ . Thus, exogenous public consumption growth operates like a
shift factor, which alters the value of the rate of time preference. As a consequence,
all the results derived in section 3 carries over to the case of multiplicative utility; the
only novelty is that q  is replaced by q¢ in all our derivations.
Let us next consider the case of a dynamic Laffer effect in the sense of
DEFINITION 2. In this case the growth rate of G is in fact tied to the growth rate of C;
i.e. we have that  G G C C & & = . We may then write (A2) as23




where  )) 1 ( 1 ( 1 h s + - = ¢ s . Thus, public consumption growth now operates as an
adjustment to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. As all the other derivations
remain the same, the only modification introduced by multiplicative utility is that we
have to replace s  with s¢ in inequality (18), which sets the stage for PROPOSITION 3.24
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Table 1: Ranking of OECD countries with respect to the transfer-adjusted aggregate
 tax rate, 
1 / 0 0 - T C
t
t  includes social security contributions t  excludes social security contributions
Sweden 0.618 Denmark (1995) 0.458
Finland 0.477 Sweden 0.434
Denmark (1995) 0.472 Finland 0.354
Netherlands 0.396 Netherlands 0.239
France 0.363 Belgium 0.232
Belgium 0.343 Norway 0.226
Austria 0.332 Austria 0.217
Norway 0.295 France 0.206
Italy 0.235 Italy 0.155
Germany 0.224 Germany 0.133
Czech Rep. (1994) 0.202 Ireland (1995) 0.129
Ireland (1995) 0.150 Czech Rep. (1994) 0.117
Spain 0.149 United Kingdom 0.107
Switzerland 0.140 Canada 0.100
Greece (1995) 0.133 Spain 0.096
United Kingdom 0.130 Australia 0.095
Canada 0.119 Greece (1995) 0.092
Portugal (1995) 0.118 Switzerland 0.088
Australia 0.095 Portugal (1995) 0.087
Japan 0.094 Japan 0.060
United States 0.071 Iceland 0.056
Iceland 0.060 United States 0.054
Korea 0.020 Korea 0.019
Sources: The tax rates are taken from OECD Revenue Statistics 1965/98 (Paris 1999). Initial transfers and
initial consumption are taken from OECD National Accounts 1984-1996, Volume II (Paris 1998). For
each country, we have computed the level of transfers from Table 6, ”Accounts for general government,
Disbursements”, as the sum of row 26 (subsidies) and row 27 (other current transfers), minus row 35
(transfers to the rest of the world). We have computed consumption from Table 2, “Private consumption
by type and purpose”, row 43 (private final consumption expenditure).